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ABSTRACT
This article analyses the origin of the persistently high level of electricity
prices that hampered the expansion of electricity consumption during the
interwar period in Porto. Initially, the rent-seeking behaviour of both the supply
firm and the City Hall at the local level affected the expansion of the local
electricity market. During the 1930s, this collusion at municipal level coincided
with unpredictable energy policies at state level. This circumstance impeded the
indispensable increase of scale and the building of a regional market of elec-
tricity in north Portugal. The literature on regulation and institutional analysis
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RESUMEN
Este artı´culo analiza el origen de los elevados precios de la electricidad en
Oporto entre las dos guerra mundiales y su secuela, su lenta electrificacio´n.
La colusio´n entre la compan˜ı´a suministradora y el municipio limito´ la
expansio´n al comenzar el servicio hidroele´ctrico; luego, la expectativa
reiteradamente frustrada de una mayor intervencio´n gubernamental fue en
detrimento de mayores inversiones. Se impidio´ ası´ el necesario aumento de
escala, la plena integracio´n del mercado ele´ctrico del Norte de Portugal y, en
consecuencia, los precios ele´ctricos se mantuvieron elevados y la electrificacio´n
sufrio´ un persistente atraso. La adopcio´n de una perspectiva institucional
se ha revelado muy u´til para esclarecer el funcionamiento de este mercado,
que se ha examinado consultando fuentes empresariales, municipales y
gubernamentales.
Palabras clave: Portugal, tarifas ele´ctricas, mercados ele´ctricos, regulacio´n
y perı´odo de entreguerras
1. INTRODUCTION
The Unia˜o Electrica Portuguesa (UEP) supplied the city of Porto in
north Portugal with electricity between 1923 and the 2nd World War. This
half-foreign company used the energy from Lindoso, a waterfall near the
Spanish border that belonged to Electra de Lima, in the industrialised region
of Porto, which includes Braga, Vila-Nova de Gaia and Coimbra. The
municipality of Porto had been responsible for the retail service in the city
since 1919 when this service was put under municipal ownership and
managed by an agency, the Serviços Municipalisados de Ga´s e Electricidade
de Porto (SMGE). The concession to the UEP was granted by consecutive
open tenders and its conditions included rates of purchase and quantities of
electricity. After 1926, the Portuguese government played an active role in
controlling the progress of the electricity sector. However, the regulation of
the Portuguese electrical markets was left mainly to local authorities until
the early 1940s1.
Porto followed an institutional path that was widespread in Europe
during the first decades of the 20th century. The distribution service became
a municipal responsibility and, at some point, the city agency started to
be supplied by a private company while the government did not regulate
electricity markets. This pattern of utility regulation followed the French
1 Portugal, in Madureira (2005) and Matos (2004); Porto, in Matos (2003a); Lima, in Bartolome´
(2009).
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model: municipal concession contracts with a particular administrative
court to supervise renegotiations (Go´mez Iba´n˜ez 2003, p. 34). Porto also
followed a common pattern of electrification. The city started to be supplied
with hydroelectricity and followed a path of electricity substitution2. Hydro-
electricity was linked to commercial electricity, which gradually replaced coal
as an energy input in residential uses, transport and manufacture. As can be
seen in Table 1, electrification in the European water-powered peripheries
proved rapid and intensive. The abundance of water resources in northern
countries prompted a sustained electrification based on the comparative
advantage of inexpensive electricity, encouraging a wide range of intensive
uses of hydroelectricity3. In the south, that is, Italy and Spain, water abun-
dance represented a clear relative advantage for these countries, which were
poorly endowed with coal. In the early years of the 20th century, the coincidence
of relative water abundance and high levels of both income and industrialisa-
tion favoured initial substitutability in some regions of Italy, Spain and France.
This was basically stimulated by the divergence in the relative prices of coal and
hydroelectricity, which went hand in hand with the augmentation of electricity
consumption in both residential and manufacturing sectors. Electricity markets
subsequently expanded rapidly during the interwar period as economies of scale
and network externalities favoured sustained increases in energy consumption
in this southern periphery (Segreto 1993)4.
However, hydroelectricity did not make a great difference in Portugal
or in Porto itself. The consumption of electricity per capita in Porto was half
the Spanish average during the interwar period whilst the retail prices of
TABLE 1
ELECTRICITY OUTPUT PER HEAD, 1910-1955 (kWh)
Norway Sweden Switzerland Italy Spain Portugal
1910 429 n.a. 295 n.a. 19 n.a.
1922 1,884 444 760 151 50 20
1928 2,496 758 1,236 262 99 31
1937 3,154 1,257 1,558 343 103 52
1946 3,616 2,113 2,255 377 200 79
1955 6,619 3,404 3,102 746 407 218
Sources: Etemad and Luciani (1991); http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm.
2 Described by Devine (1983).
3 A relevant global approach, in Hausman (2008, Chs 2-3).
4 The two patterns of hydroelectricity in Europe: electricity expansion in the north and elec-
tricity substitution in the south, in Madureira (2008, pp. 3-9).
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electricity relative to coal did not fall as sharply in Porto as they did in Spain
until 1938 (Matos 2003a, pp. 197, 217)5. Actually, the growth of the electricity
market in Porto proceeded slowly, as it did in Portugal in general.
The early urban services markets in Porto are reasonably well docu-
mented thanks to Matos (2003b) and Matos and Silva (2004). The evolution
of the energy supply, the use of energy sources and the flourishing electrical
and gas firms are all clearly depicted. Similarly, the early initiatives and
the absorption by the municipal authority are well explained, as are the
consecutive contracts between the municipality and the companies. Still, it is
difficult to obtain a clear idea of what happened between the first contract
signed by SMGE and the UEP in 1922 and that of 1938, namely when the
town enjoyed the use of hydroelectricity under public rule but previous
delays in the electrification process had not been overcome.
This article analyses the origin of the persistently high level of electricity
prices, which hampered the expansion of electricity consumption during the
interwar period in Porto. The coincidence of unpredictable energy policies
at state level and the rent-seeking behaviour of both the supply firm and the
City Hall at the local level affected the expansion of the electricity market.
A comparative perspective, with a look at the situation in neighbouring
areas, that is the Spanish markets, allows us to gauge and illustrate the
significance of this phenomenon.
2. «O PROBLEMA ELECTRICO PORTUGUEˆS»
The lines of Electra de Lima reached the Porto area in 1922. The high
tension (HT) lines of a foreign-owned company transported hydroelectricity
to an industrialised region where self-generated energy had previously been
prominent. The Porto district was an important centre of manufacturing
industry (cotton-textile, pottery and glass factories) where tiny workshops
existed alongside huge plants. In 1922, more than 1,000 small electric engines
(less than 7.46 kW of capacity) were still in use, while five factories had more
than 746 kW at their disposal (Matos 2003a, pp. 206-207). In 1928, when the
subsidiary thermal station of Freixo was inaugurated in order to support the
load peaks of the UEP’s system, twenty-eight factories were yet to be linked to
the commercial network. Instead, they were still supplied with energy by self-
generation equipment, steam and gas converters, with a total capacity
,3,500 kW (20 per cent of the UEP’s total hydroelectric capacity)6.
Barcelona, Genoa and Valencia were all urban areas of the southern
periphery, centres of industrialised regions where self-powered equipment
was prominent before the arrival of hydroelectricity. Since then, electrification
5 Madureira and Teives (2005, p. 22) have shown that retail prices of electricity did not fall
throughout Portugal until 1945, Porto and Lisbon included.
6 These factories had more than 20 kW of capacity at their disposal (Matos 2004, p. 211).
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expanded rapidly, because hydroelectricity accelerated the substitution
process of coal into commercial electricity (Doria and Hertner 2004, pp. 217-
248). However, although some hydroelectricity was available, this was not
the case in Porto. For instance, Valencia and Porto had similar populations
in 1935 and the manufacturing sector was prominent in both areas. How-
ever, the total consumption of electricity per head in Valencia was 241 kWh
while in the city of Porto the figure was still only 56 kWh7. According
to Madureira (2007, p. 601), electrification proceeded slowly throughout
Portugal until the implementation of Salazar’s projects in 1944, due to the
country’s low level of urbanisation and the high percentage of the active
population employed in agriculture.
In Spain, the process of electrification expanded earlier and more vigor-
ously than in Portugal. Total electricity output per head and industrial
consumption per head diverged clearly and persistently until 1935, although
both countries were pursuing not so different patterns of energy use before
the 2nd World War, as the evolution of electricity consumption by GDP unit
shows (see Table 2). In Portugal, the process of electrification catching up did
not start until the 1950s when Salazar’s electricity expansion project was
introduced. This electrification plan was under the total control of state
bodies and included, in the first place, a complete plan to build supply
facilities. The state project required the exploitation of water resources but
this was to be performed by joint-venture firms, with the contribution of both
the private sector and public agencies. Second, the plan included the
encouragement of intensive consumers of energy like the electro-chemical
and electro-metallurgy sectors. As Figure 1 shows, the electrification take-off
was dependent on hydroelectricity in these three countries of the southern
periphery, but the timing of the Portuguese rise was delayed until the 1950s.
Here, imported coal retained its position as the most important source of
electric energy for a long time, while in 1901 water had already become the
main primary supply of electric energy in Spain, and in Italy it accounted for
more than 80 per cent of the total electricity output.
The so-called «problema electrico portugueˆs», that is the clear delay in the
electrification of the urban centres in Portugal during the interwar period
was an ongoing concern for politicians and technicians. Two of the most
important contemporary engineers, Ezequiel de Campos and Jose´ do Nasci-
mento Ferreira Dias, were involved in the discussion and they were main players
in the institutional arena, from municipal to state bodies8. Campos was of
the opinion that the low level of per capita income would have accounted for
7 The population of Valencia was 282,000 in 1930 and 358,000 in the district; 232,000 in Porto
and 252,000 in the district (Baganha and Marques 2001; Nicola´u 2005). Caˆmara Municipal de Porto
(1935); Archivo Estafeta-INI, leg. 250, c. 6. Sirvent.
8 Campos was the director of the SMGE for the whole period and Ferreira Dias was responsible
for Serviços Ele´ctricos (1931-1935) and the Junta de Electrificaça˜o Nacional (1936-1940). Ferreira
Dias, in Branda˜o de Brito (1998, Introduça˜o).
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TABLE 2
ELECTRICITY OUTPUT AND INDUSTRIAL CONSUMPTION IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN
Portugal Spain
Total
electricity
output
(GWh)
Hydro-
electricity
output
(GWh)
Electricity
output per
head
(kWh)
Industrial
consumption
per head
(kWh)
Electricity
per GDP
(kWh)
Total
electricity
output
(GWh)
Hydro-
electricity
output
(GWh)
Output
per
head
(kWh)
Industrial
consump-
tion per
head (kWh)
Electricity
per GDP
(kWh)
1913 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 352 278 17.37 6.12 8.45
1922 18 n.a. 19.71 n.a. 21.28 1,402 1,215 64.82 28.34 28.39
1935 355 116 50.52 26.24 29.48 3,153 2,883 148.30 72.54 57.42
1940 460 178 59.30 31.36 37.11 3,617 3,353 140.43 73.57 67.50
1950 941 436 110.60 72.52 53.48 6,853 5,017 248.17 128.71 112.58
1960 3,263 3,104 399.80 270.81 122.16 18,614 15,625 614.26 208.03 197.77
Sources: Madureira and Teives (2005), Madureira (2008, p. 17), Bastien (2001); http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm; Bartolome´ (2007) and
Nicola´u (2005).
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the poor level of Portuguese electrification up to the 1950s9. In his macro-
economic view, energy independence based on the replacement of coal
would contribute to improve the availability of the domestic supply of
capital. Campos regarded municipalities and private firms as essential actors
in the development of hydropower. In contrast, Ferreira Dias emphasised the
responsibility of the companies for the lack of capital investment. He
believed that electricity should form part of a project of industrial policy,
based on demand side stimulus. The promotion of new manufacturing
activities by state organisms, namely intensive manufactures, would accel-
erate the rationalisation of both generating and transmission cycles of the
electricity sector (Madureira 2008, pp. 15-17). Finally, Salazar’s plan was put
together under the personal direction of Ferreira Dias and dominated by his
ideas, but until its implementation the issue remained under discussion.
Porto was an important urban and manufacturing district in 1922, where
electricity consumption per capita for motive power (24 kWh) was similar to
the Spanish average (28 kWh). However, in 1935, the consumption of elec-
tricity per capita for industrial purposes had only doubled in Porto whilst it
had multiplied threefold in Spain (Direcça˜o Geral 1935; Bartolome´ 2007,
Anexo 1). As can be seen in Table 3, total electricity consumption in the
FIGURE 1
HYDROELECTRIC OUTPUT AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ELECTRICITY OUTPUT
IN ITALY, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN
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Sources: Giannetti (1985), Etedman and Luciani (1991), Madureira and Teives (2005) and Bartolome´
(2007).
9 Campos (1922, p. 123) illustrated this: «y para sair do circulo vicioso de o povo estar mal
(em todos os sentidos) e pobre de electricidade, porque na˜o se fazem as obras hydro-ele´ctricas e na˜o
se fazem estas obras porque sa˜o ma´s as circunstaˆncias do povo». Henriques (2011) links this theory
with the continuity in the patterns of energy consumption.
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district only accelerated in the early 1930s and during the 2nd World War.
During the whole period, the Porto district absorbed an important share of
Portugal’s total industrial consumption of electricity. However, although
commercial electricity advanced in the late 1920s, the percentage of self-
powered consumption remained high and steady until 1944 when it rapidly
decreased. The number of self-powered plants continued to grow until 1938
and in 1945 there were still 4,708 kW of self-generating equipment in use
(Matos 2004, pp. 212-213). In the city of Porto in 1933, a decade after the
arrival of hydroelectricity, the UEP acknowledged that the substitution
process was still in progress and almost 40 per cent of the total annual
consumption of electricity was powered by self-generation in the urban
centre10. The town was served by the municipal agency, whose figures show
that the total consumption of commercial electricity per inhabitant grew as
slowly as the use per customer11.
The electrification level is usually correlated to three main factors in the
water-powered peripheries: per capita income levels (although differences
remained according to the diverse patterns of industrialisation), abundance
TABLE 3
ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION IN THE DISTRICT OF PORTO
Total
consumption
in Porto
district (GWh)
Industrial
consumption in
Porto district as a
percentage of whole
Portugal (%)
Industrial
consumption as a
percentage of total
consumption in
Porto district (%)
Self-generation
consumption
as a percentage
of total industrial
consumption in
Porto (%)
1927 42 26.35 56.70 70.22
1932 68 28.04 63.15 54.94
1937 86 25.06 59.36 53.12
1942 94 24.28 64.18 42.74
1945 120 28.14 55.59 11.56
1950 228 26.07 49.55 6.41
1955 363 23.59 47.82 4.92
1960 561 22.22 45.56 6.38
Source: Direcça˜o Geral dos Serviços Ele´ctricos (1928-1960).
10 CD-EDP: FD 29 C5P6.
11 The total consumption of electricity per inhabitant grew from 53.17 kWh in 1934 to
70.58 kWh in 1943. The consumption per customer also rose from 363.93 kWh in 1934 to
383.37 kWh in 1943. The growth of consumption for industrial purposes was almost inappreciable:
that is, 20 kWh in 1934 to 23.34 kWh/habitant in 1943 (Caˆmara 1918-1943).
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of water resources and public regulation of electricity markets, namely
municipal and state control of both market access and utility rates12.
As can be seen in Table 4, the evolution of total consumption of electricity
per head after 1922 in both Spain and Portugal was quite independent of the
evolution of income levels. The use of electricity per output unit was much
more intense in Spain although it was quite similar for both countries in
1922 (see Table 2). This has been correlated to divergence in energy paths in
the long term. However, when organic sources of energy are included in the
historical statistics for total energy, the role played by the diversity of energy
paths tends to minimise (Madureira and Teives 2005).
The hypothesis of the role played by energy deposit abundance in both
industrialisation and electrification transitions has a long tradition (Wrigley
1988; Bardini 1997; Sudria` and Bartolome´ 2010). Portugal’s coal deposits were
extremely poor and thus most of the coal in use was imported. The international
accounts of hydropower potential in Europe carried out by international
agencies as of 1950 have demonstrated its relative abundance in Portugal. The
economical use of hydrological potential for obtaining electricity in Portugal per
km2 (32 MWh) was similar to that of Italy (36 MWh) and greater than that of
Spain (21 MWh) and France (26 MWh; UN 1953). However, these international
accounts diverge from those of contemporaries in the 1930s because the tech-
nology linked to dam building was still in progress. Actually, the exploitation of
TABLE 4
PER CAPITA INCOME AND ELECTRICITY OUTPUT PER CAPITA, IN PORTUGAL
AND SPAIN
Portugal Spain
GDP per capita kWh per capita GDP per capita kWh per capita
1913 1,250 n.a. 2,056 17.37
1922 1,430 19.71 2,284 64.82
1935 1,690 50.52 2,583 148.30
1940 1,615 59.30 2,080 140.43
1950 2,086 110.60 2,189 248.17
1960 2,956 399.80 3,072 614.26
Sources: Same as Table 2.
12 Svennilson (1954) emphasised the relationship between electrification and economic growth.
Tafunell (2010, p. 22) has recently drawn attention to the correlation between per capita income and
electrification in Latin America. The literature on water resources abundance and electrification is
vast. Comparisons at European level in Segreto (1992, 1993). For Regulation policies see Section 3.
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hydroelectricity was very costly in Portugal, essentially because there were few
waterfalls (like Lindoso) with constant flowing water that were inexpensive
to use. Most water locations required an exploitation of hydroelectricity by
means of dams and reservoirs. Therefore, coal was relatively cheap, that is, in
operational utilities in use in Portugal, there was almost no advantage to using
water rather than coal as the primary resource for obtaining electricity in the
early 1930s13.
Actually, energy prices played their role in early electrifications and
proved relevant in Spain where the marked change in the price of hydroelec-
tricity in relation to coal in manufacturing areas accelerated the substitution of
energies and the adoption of commercial electricity14. Similarly, high electricity
prices are linked to low levels of consumption in South America during the
1920s (Tafunell 2010). In the 1930s in Portugal, commercial electricity for
manufacturing was regarded as expensive by foreign technicians, who linked
the persistent use of self-generating equipment in the manufacturing industry to
the slow shift from steam to hydroelectricity15.
Betra´n (2005, p. 78) has pointed out that the higher the price of hydro-
electricity in relation to coal, the less intensive the electrification process
during the interwar period. The evolution of relative prices of coal to
hydroelectricity in Portugal was not as favourable as it was in Spain during
the 1920s. As can be seen in Figure 2, the relative price of coal to electricity
changed in both countries during the 1st World War when the price of coal
rose due to supply difficulties. Once the war had ended, the relative price of
coal to electricity remained high in Spain — when comparing foreign coal it
is even higher — while in Portugal it returned to the prewar level. Compared
with the data of a city like Madrid, which experienced rapid electrification,
the divergence with the evolution in Porto is noteworthy. In contrast, during
the 2nd World War, the change in the evolution of the price of coal relative
to electricity was more prominent in Portugal and this accompanied the
beginning of the electrification process16.
Hence, relative prices were against the shift from steam to electricity in
Portugal. As can be seen in Figure 3, electricity prices followed the same path
of growth and stagnation as general consumption prices during this period in
Portugal, with wages also following the same path. Thus, electrification
could not be encouraged by the substitution of work for capital as it was in
Madrid (Aubanell 2001). Furthermore, coal prices did not rise as much as
general prices and electricity prices did not experience a similar drop to that
of Spain. The change in Portugal was only observed as of 1939.
13 According to Uriarte and Guinea, El problema ele´ctrico portugue´s, 1932. AHISA-Fondo Hidrola.
14 United States, Woolf (1984); Spain, Aubanell (2001) and Bartolome´ (2007, p. 76).
15 Report presented by the Iberian Electricity Company to the Portuguese government in April
1931. CD-EDP: FD 26 C2P6.
16 In contrast, Madureira (2007, p. 610) posited that the real cost of electricity in the 1930s has
little explanatory value when regional divergences in electrification are analysed.
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Why did the trend of relative energy prices diverge in Portugal, and more
specifically in Porto? As of 1923, the city was served with inexpensive
hydroelectricity from Lindoso, a small but adequate waterfall for supplying
its developing local market. Natural constraints, then, cannot be said to
explain the small impact of hydroelectricity. There may have been institu-
tional origins behind the high level of electricity prices in this city during the
1920s: firms may have avoided competition and the municipality may have
played its role in increasing rather than lowering these prices. During the
1930s, persistently high electricity prices may be explained by the Ferreira
Dias argument. He posited that capital investments were interrupted when
increasing scale economies of generating hydroelectricity and network
externalities would have been essential in order to reduce electricity prices
throughout the country (Branda˜o de Brito 1998, p. 286). His argument fits
well with Hausman and Neufeld’s findings (2004). According to them,
as electricity networks were extended and transmission lines went well
outside city limits, the need for capital investment in the electrical industry
grew in tandem with hydroelectric equipment and transmission lines.
Economies of scale of durable assets were transferred from the distribution
cycle (within a town) to generation and transmission networks (able to serve
FIGURE 2
THE EVOLUTION OF THE RELATIVE PRICE OF COAL TO ELECTRICITY IN SPAIN
AND PORTO
(Index of ratios of nominal prices, 19175100).
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an entire region)17. In north Portugal, this process was interrupted when
local markets were not interconnected until the 1940s, but not only by the
rapacity of the electricity companies, as Ferreira Dias suggested, but also by
the reinforcement of the firms’ defensive policies that both institutions,
initially the municipality of Porto and afterwards the Portuguese state
accomplished. This stopped supply companies and municipal retailers pro-
viding venture capital when it became crucial to increase scale economies
and positive network externalities.
3. ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND REGULATORY POLICIES DURING
THE INTERWAR PERIOD
Traditional public interest theory has focused on local markets, where
electricity provides outstanding examples of natural monopolies during
FIGURE 3
THE EVOLUTION OF ELECTRICITY PRICES IN PORTO, WAGES, CONSUMPTION
PRICES AND COAL PRICES IN PORTUGAL 1913-1945
(Index of nominal prices in a logarithmic scale, 19175 100).
1
10
100
1000
10000
19
13
19
15
19
17
19
19
19
21
19
23
19
25
19
27
19
29
19
31
19
33
19
35
19
37
19
39
19
41
19
43
19
45
Electricity
Wages
Prices
Coal
Sources: Caˆmara Municipal de Porto (1918-1945); Bastien (2001) and Henriques (2011).
17 The technology of gas, electricity and trams in the 19th century allowed economies of scale in
production and delivery over a spatially limited area, since utility markets rarely exceeded the size of
a medium-sized city.
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the interwar period18. The case of the city of Chicago has usually illustrated
the importance of early regulation of electricity markets in paving the way
for electrification. According to this theory, where electricity markets were
regulated, both the retail prices of electricity and monopolistic rents were
lowered and electrification expanded rapidly19. New Institutional Economics
theory has also drawn attention to local markets. Electricity supply indus-
tries stood out for the specificity of their long duration and costly assets and
they were never organised as competitive markets due to high transaction
costs. Electricity companies found it impossible to move or resell their
capital, increasing the risk of investing in this industry. According to this
view, cities granted companies the rights they needed to build utilities and
set up networks using politically administered solutions such as contracts
and municipal franchises, as opposed to market-administered solutions.
In return, companies agreed to charge limited rates (via a system of price
ceilings) and to provide electricity of a specified quality. Additionally, the
firms sometimes agreed to pay the city a percentage of their earnings. These
were channelled into the municipal accounts and contributed to reducing
local taxes (Spiller and Tommasi 2005)20. Actually, municipal ownership of
utilities was linked to the essential need to raise municipal incomes in
emergent manufacturing towns (Millward 2004, p. 12).
Disagreement arises when the origin of state regulation is analysed. On
the one hand, both Public Interest Theory and rent-seeking approaches
emphasised the importance of the appropriation of monopoly rents. The
former defended regulation as a way to contend market power; the latter
posited that regulatory bodies often acted as agents for producers since entry
restriction was likely to generate monopoly rents21. On the other hand, New
Institutional Economics has highlighted the importance of the appropriation
of quasi-rents, that is, the difference between the value of fixed capital and
its value in the best alternative use. In local markets, corruption, involving
municipal officers and utility companies, may arise when utilities had to
secure municipal franchises. As Troesken (1996) demonstrated for Chicago’s
gas industry, the rapacity of the City Hall imposed such low rates for the gas
company that the return of sunk costs was impossible. State regulation of the
gas industry in Chicago arose as an instrument to avoid municipal corrup-
tion and as an alternative to municipal ownership. In regional markets, since
quasi-rents grew alongside generation and transmission, state regulation has
18 See Averch and Johnson (1962) and Laffont and Tirole (1993). On differences in electricity
cycles, see Joskow and Schmalensee (1983) and Joskow (1996). See a discussion on regulation and
deregulation case studies in Gilbert and Khan (1996).
19 Chicago, in Hughes (1983).
20 Madureira (2007) has also emphasised the contractual opportunism on behalf of the supply
companies.
21 Stigler and Friedland (1962) and Williamson (1979); the cost of regulation in Crew and
Kleindorfer (1986, p. 169) and Crew and Kleindorfer (2002).
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been linked to the process of building regional markets and the establishment
of transmission networks22. Neufeld (2008, p. 1064) has recently emphasised
that the timing of state regulation in the United States was linked to the need
for utilities to obtain large investments in transmission. These specific assets
created appropriable quasi-rents, which made it difficult for electricity compa-
nies to operate in competitive markets or under the contractual franchises
that characterised early municipal regulation. In Neufeld’s view (2008, p. 1066),
rent-seeking behaviour on behalf of utility managers should be regarded as
protection of quasi-rents, since the loss of quasi-rents would not result in an
immediate shutdown, but both the replacement and the augmentation of
capital investment would be inhibited. State regulation assured a stable setting
in terms of legislation and increased the confidence of future investors in the
return of sunk costs.
The case of the Porto electricity market followed a distinct path of reg-
ulatory policy. The municipality obtained the exclusive right to retail gas and
electricity in 1919 and used the franchise bidding procedure to sign supply
contracts with hydroelectric companies in the area by bargaining prices and
quantities of energy. The municipality used a special agency, the SMGE, to
retain the delivery of low tension services — lighting and manufacture — and
established retail electricity prices. From the 1930s, the state gradually
assumed network planning and, after 1944, it virtually commanded the
progression of the total electricity power capacity and demand needs,
although the ownership of the power-generating assets remained in the private
sector (Madureira and Bussola 2005, p. 63).
As the following pages attempt to demonstrate, this story of Porto’s
electricity market is in keeping with Neufeld, who combined different
approaches in order to explain this transition. As of 1938, state intervention
assured not only that electricity prices were lowered, but also the payback of
the companies’ sunk costs for building a regional market and increasing the
economies of scale of both generation and transmission.
4. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR: THE
HESITANT RULING POLICY
The electricity sector was mainly left under municipal control in Portugal
until 1926. Concession agreements were an exclusively municipal pre-
rogative with municipalities awarding contracts of energy distribution to
private companies via franchise bidding procedures. Monopoly situations
were not formally avoided and municipalities were free to establish rates for
the purchase of electricity at local level. The granting of water permissions
22 Hausman and Neufeld (2004, pp. 1050-1073) stated that the effective demand for regulation
was usually a hybrid of the need to obtain funds and obstruct market power.
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and the concessions of network tendering were the only prerogatives in state
hands. This loose market regulation has usually been argued to be one of the
origins of «the miniaturization of the sector» in Portugal, namely making it
infeasible to achieve the necessary economies of scale23.
Thereafter, the Lei dos Aproveitamentos Hidra´ulicos and the Lei da Rede
Nacional inaugurated a new phase of transition in state intervention in
Portugal24. The former reinforced the state’s role in the granting of permis-
sions for exploiting waterfalls; the latter was a call for the tendering of out-
line proposals to set up a national electricity grid and the respective transport
lines. Although there were no major outcomes as a result of this legislation,
hope for the implementation of a major electrification plan was encouraged
in 1931 when Decree No. 20,225 declared the government’s intentions to
intervene in the electrification of Portugal25. The new legislation essentially
opened a tender after two solid proposals were received from two foreign
electrical conglomerates, Iberian Electric Limited and the Westinghouse Electric
International Company. When the tender was closed in January 1932, there were
eleven proposals from manufacturing and electric-conglomerates all over the
world. A group of Swiss companies won the tender although the government’s
lack of capital was mentioned as the origin of the project’s suspension26. This
episode made it clear to companies and municipalities that the forthcoming
state intervention would be the main variable of future electrification.
During the 1930s, there was an additional proposal from Westinghouse,
the Anglo-American group, with the support of Sofina in Lisbon on the River
Zeˆzere. The UEP, in Ca´vado-Rabaga˜o and the Douro, also attempted to
invest in hydroelectricity in Portugal. However, Ferreira Dias rejected these
foreign interventions as he did with the rest of the UEP’s expansion projects27.
As a result, the growth of the whole electricity system seemed to be threatened
by the reluctance of the state bodies to entrust concessions of electrical
infrastructures to foreign firms. In 1936, with the constitution of the National
Electrification Board, a new era of state regulation was inaugurated. First, local
concession contracts started to be controlled and regulated by this organism.
Second, attempts were made to avoid local monopolies by the concession of
contracts to several supply companies. Finally, electricity rates came under
revision and the criterion of favouring larger consumers was implemented28.
However, the great changes would come with the rise of coal prices
during the 2nd World War. In the transmission cycle, the interconnection of
the power stations of northern Portugal was ordered in June 1943 to save on
23 Nevertheless, the ruling of the Spanish electricity sector was even more liberal and this is
argued to be one of the strong points of the Spanish electricity sector (Bartolome´ 2007, Ch. 4).
24 The Lei dos aproveitamentos, October 20, 1926 and Lei da Rede Nacional, August 25, 1927.
25 Dia´rio do Governo, August 17, 1931.
26 CD-EDP: FD 26 C5P7.
27 August 21, 1933, CD-EDP: FD 28 C4P4.
28 The Decree was 27, 289 of November 24, 1936.
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foreign coal and maximise the use of the available hydroelectric power29. At
the generating level, in 1944, the Lei 2,002 finally implemented Salazar’s
plans for the electricity sector. It was based on the collaboration between
companies and the government in an electrification process ordered and
planned by government organisms. The clauses were rigid but this meant the
existence of a consistent project that transmitted confidence to potential
investors. It consisted of the establishment of new companies, Hidroele´ctrica
do Ca´vado and Hidroele´ctrica do Zeˆzere, to exploit large-capacity hydro-
electric power stations on the Zeˆzere and Ca´vado-Rabaga˜o rivers, following a
joint-venture model, financed by public and private capital. In 1947, a new
company, Companhia Nacional de Electricidade (CNE), was also founded. As
Madureira (2008, pp. 14-18) posited, the hard version of electrification, ruled
by the state, succeeded in achieving its goals in a climate of supply shortage
of energy caused by the world conflict.
5. THE ENERGY COMPANY: THE UEP, A SEMI-PORTUGUESE FIRM
As of 1905, the financial requirements of the electrical industry grew
enormously. This process went hand in hand with the internationalisation of
electricity companies. The scale of long-distance transmission lines, electrical
utilities and the management of electrical systems multiplied, as did their
financial needs. More specifically, hydro-electrical firms were capital-intensive
and this entailed a continuous and huge flow of capital. Hydroelectric assets
were fixed and could not be removed and used for other activities. Investing in
hydroelectricity implied sunk costs and the investment did not yield short-term
profits. In addition, the need for capital did not stop once the water-power
systems were launched. The electrical firms were involved in an endless process
of absorbing not only intensive consumers such as chemical industries, but also
competitors, that is, smaller electricity companies, so as to build regional
monopolies. The role played by the international electrical conglomerates
included a sophisticated supply of human capital for building hydro-utilities
and running electrical systems (Segreto 1992; Hertner and Nelles 2007).
Foreign capital had reached electricity companies in Portugal by means
of gas firms. Lisbon was under the rule of the Socie´te´ Financie`re de Transports
et d’Entreprises Industrielles (SOFINA). This was the Allgemeine Elektricita¨ts-
Gesellschaft’s (AEG)’s Belgian holding and it controlled some financing
companies in the European periphery. In 1913, SOFINA had acquired a
significant share of capital of the Lisbon company, Companhias Reunidas
Ga´s e Electricidade (CRGE); founded in 1891, it was the main energy utility
group in Portugal. Although CRGE had obtained an important part of the
local delivery company in Porto in 1897, this service was brought under
29 Order of June 7, 1943 (and the subsequent Decree No. 33.672 of May 26, 1944).
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municipal ownership in 1919. Porto City Council bought their investment
from the shareholders of the Companhia do Ga´s e Electricidade do Porto. This
firm had held the electricity concession in the city since 1907 when the
Sociedade de Energia Ele´ctrica assigned it to the Companhia and finally
purchased the concession in 1912. The Ouro thermal utility had been man-
aged by the Sociedade since 1895 and most of the equipment was out of order
when the municipality started to manage the power facility in November
1917 (Matos 2003a; 2003b, pp. 88-94; Silva and Matos 2004).
The UEP was formed in 1919 as a joint venture of Spanish and Portuguese
entrepreneurs for the distribution of hydroelectricity obtained at Lindoso30. This
water-fall was the main asset of Electra de Lima, a Spanish company which
represented the Portuguese branch of the Banco of Vizcaya’s electricity holding
group (Bartolome´ 2009, p. 124). The Portuguese counterpart in the UEP was the
Pinto e Sotto-Mayor bank (Caˆmara 1989). As part of the expansion strategy of
the Spanish holding to the west, Electra de Lima planned to supply electricity to
the Porto region and it obtained the concession for an HT electricity line from
Lindoso to the city in 192131. The Vizcaya’s electricity group was not used to
organising exploitation in a vertically integrated structure. The corporate
strategy developed in some Spanish markets segregated the cycles into two
different companies, but the delivery company was controlled by the generating
one (Anes 2006). Hence, the UEP was set up to distribute energy to the Por-
tuguese urban markets in the north using Iberian capital and entrepreneurship
and its Portuguese registration was supposed to pave the way for acquiring
licenses and authorizations when necessary. The UEP only served energy from
Lima and, in turn, was responsible for thermal support and maintaining the
voltage of the electrical system. The energy was to be paid for in golden cur-
rency and the retail prices would be fixed by agreement between the companies,
Lima would support the UEP in the case of competition32.
The UEP was planned in order to underpin the company’s growth over
the next 20 years. The voltage was calculated to resist a fourfold increase in
installed capacity, a sixfold augmentation in the electricity output and a
twenty-eightfold increase in the transmission networks33. From the begin-
ning, the company followed an extensive pattern of growth through the
implementation of a network of urban centres (point-to-point). The expected
density of demand was weak, but this policy of extensive market coverage
was also the usual procedure of the Vizcaya group in Spain. However, post
1932, the UEP had to readjust its goals when the government stopped
granting tenders of new lines to the company. It had to strengthen secondary
30 The UEP was founded on March 29, 1919. The capital stock was 5 million escudos making it
the largest company in north Portugal (CD-EDP: UEP Escritura).
31 Notas sobre la Historia de la S.A. Electra de Lima, Fondo Lima, AHISA.
32 BD-UEP: May 26, 1926.
33 Lindoso in Bartolome´ (2009) and Madureira (2007, p. 603).
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branches to supply smaller centres and customers. As can be seen in Figure 4,
electricity output (including both hydroelectric and thermal production) grew
at 11.57 per cent in the whole period (1923-1945), while lines increased at
13.11 per cent. Between 1924 and 1938, the differences were remarkable: lines
expanded at a rate of 18.66 per cent while electricity increased at 15.14, thereby
the evolution of the electricity output in the UEP’s markets followed the
expansion of HT lines, although the rhythm of the network’s growth was faster
than that of production before 1938.
Initially, financing both the installation of HT transmission lines and the
thermal support was a major issue for the UEP. First, it had to pay for the
electrical lines connecting Lindoso with Braga and Porto that were installed
by Lima34. Second, Freixo, a thermal utility in Porto and the UEP’s main
asset, was planned in 1925 and inaugurated in 1928. Some transmission
lines, such as Porto-Coimbra in 1928, were also set up. Later, in 1933, the
UEP started buying a company in the Setubal Peninsula, the Sociedade de
Electrificaça˜o Urbana e Rurale (SEUR) and this process finished in 1941.
Capital was also invested in attempting to expand the electricity market in
north Portugal. On one hand, the UEP followed a strategy of acquiring water
resources in order to increase the availability of energy when necessary, but
FIGURE 4
UEP: ELECTRICITY EXPLOITATION
(Electricity, in kWh, on the left; HT lines, in km, on the right).
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the firm was overlooked when the most important waterfall concessions
were granted by the government35. Lindoso had been planned to supply the
city of Porto with 60 GWh (the estimated demand), but, although part of its
hydro-power capacity remained underused due to the unevenness of the
hydroelectric exploitation, it was enlarged several times between 1922 and
1941 (Bartolome´ 2009, p. 137). On the other hand, the UEP specifically
sought to control the supply of the northern electricity markets by two
means: the purchase of a portion of the capital stock of rival companies and
market agreements.
From the beginning, in the early 1920s, the UEP had to deal with a seg-
mented electricity market in the city of Porto. The municipal agency, the
SMGE, had exclusive retailing rights for any customer under the capacity of
50 kW. The Companhia dos Carrı´s de Ferro do Porto (Carrı´s) was in charge of
delivering energy to the tramway network in the city and had its own thermal
utility, Massarelos. Hence, as early as 1920, the UEP attempted to become the
majority shareholder of Carrı´s in order not only to control the city market,
but also to exploit its thermal plant, before the thermal production of Freixo
was planned. As this manoeuvre was strongly opposed, the Pinto e Sotto-Mayor
bank had to sell their portion of the capital stock36.
Contemporaneously, the UEP also attempted to expand in the rest of the
electricity markets in the north of Portugal by signing contracts with the City
Halls of Braga, Vila-Nova de Gaia, Porto and Coimbra37. However, in the late
1920s the UEP did not receive further authorisation from the government to
extend its transmission lines again in north Portugal and some competitors
appeared. The Companhia Electrica de Varosa was founded in 1907, but its
two small hydroelectric utilities on the rivers Lamego and Regua were only
able to produce energy in 1925 (Chocalho) and in 1929 (Caniços; Matos
2003a, pp. 108, 169). The UEP’s exclusive control over the provision of
hydroelectricity to the city of Porto was under serious threat and became a
real difficulty when Varosa signed an agreement in 1927 with Espinho, a
municipality in the outskirts of Porto38. Similarly, the Companhia Electro-
Hidra´ulica de Portugal (CEHP) was founded in 1918 and it obtained some
concessions on the river Ave. Their utilities were Ermal (1932), Guilhofrei
(1939) and Ponte Esperança (1943; Matos 2003a, p. 120). The aggregate
output of both companies did not reach half of the UEP’s production, but
35 The earliest attempt, in 1920, involved the Cavado-Rabaga˜o streams, followed by the Douro
in 1931.
36 BD-UEP: September 9, 1920. At the same time, the UEP bought a small portion of SGME’s
capital stock, but the shares were later sold. BD-UEP: November 7, 1928.
37 Braga and Vilanova, in BD-UEP: February 26, 1920 and BD-UEP: October 23, 1920,
respectively. The concession of the HT line from Porto to Coimbra to Santo Tirso on July 27, 1928,
in CD-EDP: UEP G4 24-10. The contract between the UEP and Coimbra’s City Council, in 1927,
CD-EDP: FD 28 C4P1.
38 BD-UEP: September 5, 1925. CD-EDP: FD 28 C4P1.
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Varosa and the CEHP ultimately merged and became the Companhia
Hidroele´ctrica do Norte de Portugal (CHENOP) and this improved its bar-
gaining power with its main competitor, the UEP39.
During the 1930s, the UEP followed a new policy of market agreements.
The UEP and Varosa signed a 6-year contract for the distribution of electricity in
the Porto region in 1931. In line with its power capacity, the important urban
centres were assigned to the UEP, while Varosa was responsible for the supply
of electricity to smaller towns and villages. The contract prevented any changes
in the respective areas40. Similarly, the UEP signed a mutual help agreement
with Carrı´s in 1931, which was still valid in 193941.
In 1932, the UEP made a concerted effort to approach the Lisbon market
and requested authorisation to study the construction of a HT line from
Coimbra to Alcobaça, but the administrative process was promptly interrupted
in September42. The UEP was essentially interested in acquiring SEUR, the
company in the Setubal Peninsula south of Lisbon and the HT line would have
helped reduce the distance between the northern and southern markets.
Although SEUR became part of the UEP in 1941, the project for a joint
company network never materialised43.
Finally, during the 2nd World War, the UEP signed market agreements
in the south with the Companhia do Alto Alentejo for the distribution of
electricity in E´vora44. In the north, new circumstances made the UEP and its
competitors interconnect their grids. On one hand, the three companies,
Varosa, the CEHP and the UEP, endorsed a new contract for the city of Porto
in 1938. On the other, the shortage of fuel led to a compulsory integration of
the networks in order to make the system in the north more efficient45.
In spite of all the rivalry the UEP had to face, internal evidence reveals
that the UEP’s returns on investment (ROI) was particularly favourable,
while that of Electra de Lima was significantly lower during the whole period
and its evolution was uneven. Figure 5 compares the profitability of another
Banco de Vizcaya electricity generation company, Hidroele´ctrica Espan˜ola
(Hidrola), with its Portuguese counterpart, Lima, and with the evolution of
the UEP. The evolution of Hidrola was steady and much better than that of
Lima until 1935, but the UEP’s situation improved greatly.
The UEP may have achieved this profitable position in two scenarios:
either as a consumer or as a provider of electricity. First, Lima might have
contributed to the UEP’s high ROI if the price paid to Lima for energy was
39 De facto, CHENOP started to play its role in 1938, but became a company, de iure, in 1943.
BD-UEP: March 26, 1943 (Matos 2003a, pp. 121, 170).
40 CD-EDP: UEP G4-2.2-3; BD-UEP: April 25, 1931.
41 September 19, 1931; CD-EDP: UEP G4-2.2-3.
42 The appeal in BD-UEP: June 19, 1932 and CD-EDP: UEP G4-2.2-3.
43 BD-UEP: February 12, 1941.
44 BD-UEP November 13, 1942.
45 BD-UEP March 26, 1943.
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low. This may well have happened in some years. According to internal
sources, a low percentage of the UEP’s unit income was used to pay for
energy from 1926 until 1935. In terms of total unit costs, the percentage for
reimbursing energy varied, but was rarely higher than 50 per cent46. The
Spanish managers attempted to increase the Portuguese partner’s confidence in
the electricity business by means of augmenting the UEP’s returns and Lima’s
financial costs did not begin to be paid back until 1930, when Lima’s share-
holders finally received some returns on equities (Bartolome´ 2009, p. 147)47.
However, the UEP’s good performance could have had an additional
component, that is, the average revenues in the exclusive Porto market. By
1938, the UEP was mostly dependent on the income obtained by the sale of
electricity to the SMGE of Porto. Although the share of the UEP’s total
production acquired by the municipal agency declined progressively (as low
as 20-25 per cent of the total output of the electricity firm), SMGE was the
essential source of the company’s income, accounting for 60 per cent of the
UEP’s revenues until 1939 (see Figure 6).
FIGURE 5
THE EVOLUTION OF ROI: ELECTRA DE LIMA, UEP AND HIDROLA, 1924-1944 (%)
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46 UEP Board of Directors (BD), Annual Reports (1926-1935). CD-EDP. Fundo UEP.
47 A similar policy was followed with the pioneer group, Antolı´n, 1989.
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To recapitulate, during the interwar period, the UEP clearly intended to
build a regional electricity market in the north of Portugal, centred in the city
of Porto. This was demonstrated by their attempts to capture energy
resources, the absorption of adversaries and market agreements. Indeed, this
corporate strategy was in line with that of the Vizcaya group as a whole in the
Peninsula (Tedde and Aubanell 2006, p. 234). Ferreira Dias, a member of the
Junta de Electrificaça˜o Nacional, stated that the UEP sought to avoid com-
petition. In a letter to the minister of commerce and public works, he noted
that the UEP was extremely interested in maintaining high prices in the open
tender for Porto in 1938 in order to recover the cost of «propaganda, con-
tracts and compensations» in its own budget48. In line with his view, internal
evidence has demonstrated that the UEP remained a remunerative business
during these years and the company was likely to obtain monopoly rents
from its main market, the city of Porto, whilst there was no payback for
FIGURE 6
SHARE OF UEP’S PRODUCTION ACQUIRED BY SMGE AND UEP INCOME SHARE
CORRESPONDING TO SMGE PAYMENTS (%)
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Lima’s investors for some years. However, this strategy did not actually help
the UEP build an exclusive regional market in the northern area of Portugal
in 1938. After 25 years of activity, a diminishing part in the Porto electricity
market was under the control of the UEP while successive requests to expand
the market — waterpower resources and HT lines — had been denied by the
government.
6. THE SERVIÇOS MUNICIPALIÇADOS DE GA´S E ELECTRIDADE
(SMGE) AND THE ELECTRICITY MARKET IN PORTO
The SMGE of Porto, dependent on the City Council, assumed the retail
service of electricity in 1917. Although SMGE had a thermal utility, the Ouro
power station, its machinery was in need of repair. The electricity service in
the city was extremely poor: there was huge waste in the distribution system
and over 1,000 requests to join the lighting service had been rejected in the
previous years due to a lack of available electricity. The gas service was
therefore overused despite permanently making a loss and, in 1920, the
difficulties in the service persuaded SMGE to take out a considerable loan
from Vicente Ribero at 4.5 per cent a year (Caˆmara 1918, pp. 4, 12; Sindicancia
1921, n. 7). Hence, the company’s estimated deficit in 1921 was 2,678,000
escudos, while its assets were assessed at roughly 500,000 escudos (Campos
1938, pp. 72, 98). When Ezequiel Campos was appointed manager of SMGE
in March 1922, the agency’s position was weak, but the municipality was
reluctant to pay a fee for the urban lighting service49.
Campos kept the obsolescence of Ouro’s machinery secret when he
started negotiations with potential suppliers — coal companies, the river
Ca´vado-Rabaga˜o concessionaires and the UEP. Simultaneously, Ezequiel
Campos attempted to construct a thermal utility on behalf of SMGE, but coal
prices rose significantly and the Portuguese currency fluctuated randomly on
the London market. SMGE’s hopes of building its own thermal utility finally
disappeared when the municipality was unable to obtain funds for the project50.
There were still two possible suppliers: Carrı´s and the UEP. Meetings with Carrı´s
started in May, but Carrı´s ended negotiations in October 1922 leaving the UEP as
the only possible provider (Campos 1922, p. 177; 1938, p. 106).
Campos wrote a brochure in January 1923 fully explaining how the
electricity rates to be paid by SMGE were estimated. Campos made an
approximate calculation of the running costs of the company’s two divisions:
gas and electricity. He also assessed the capital costs of the enlargement of
the service and the total costs of the urban consumption of gas and elec-
tricity. He then totalled the annual payment of the quota for the redemption
49 Campos’ ideas, in Matos and Faria (2003).
50 Campos tried to obtain funds from the minister of commerce and some banks (Campos 1922,
pp. 93, 121, 122).
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of the loan and the whole accumulated deficit. His next step was to gauge the
expected amount of electricity sold by SGME in 1923: 5 million kWh. This led
to an estimation of the distribution of these capital costs to every kWh
retailed: 0.50 escudos per kWh. Although electricity prices in Porto had been
increased in August, he believed that 0.910 escudos was the maximum unit
price per kWh. The maximum rate to be paid to the electricity supplier
should therefore be 0.410 per kWh, or 0.015 escudos-ouro, in gold currency
and this was SMGE’s offer to the UEP (Campos 1922, pp. 134-142; 1938, p. 82).
Electricity rates maximised the municipality’s income while the expansion of
electrification in Porto was far beyond the goals of this proposal.
The contract was finally signed on October 31, 1923 and it lasted for
3 years and 8 months until June 1927. The peak load was set at 5,500 kW at
5,000 V. SMGE was in charge of public lighting, commercial retailing of
lighting and motive power up to 50 kW, whilst the UEP would serve manu-
facturing customers. SMGE kept its own thermal utility in use because
the UEP’s commitment was initially for 8 months a year. The rate paid per
kWh delivered to Porto by the UEP was 0.0166 gold escudos51. According to
Campos, this was a temporary contract whilst waiting for any alteration in the
Portuguese hydroelectric scenario (Campos 1922, p. 154; 1938, pp. 99, 103).
In June 1926, Ouro, the thermal utility, had to be closed down. This new
setting impelled Campos to start negotiating a new contract. On one hand,
Campos attempted to improve SMGE’s position for bargaining with the
supply companies. First, he tried to repair Ouro; second, Campos started
planning the exploitation of a waterfall on Portugal’s river Douro in Bitetos
(Campos 1938, pp. 110, 123). On the other hand, the companies knew that
the scenario had not actually been modified after the last negotiation,
although the government had simultaneously begun an era of legislation of
hydroelectricity with consecutive decrees52. The domestic producers of coal
were not ready to fuel an important thermal utility in Porto with their own
minerals and Varosa was likely to be too weak to compete with the UEP.
Therefore, although Varosa was almost ready to produce electricity, it deci-
ded not to participate in the open tender in March 1927 (Campos 1938,
pp. 114, 117)53. The UEP declared its target of extending the contract with
SMGE for 10 years, but when the open tender was inaugurated in February
1927 and the conditions of the retailer were made public, the UEP agreed on
a 6-year extension of the contract until June 193354.
Campos then attempted to get the Douro’s hydroelectric project in Bitetos
rapidly underway so that it would be ready at the end of the extension.
51 CD-EDP-UEP-G4 2.2-3.
52 See Section 4.
53 Varosa had 4,300 kW at its disposal, without thermal support.
54 BD-UEP: November 17, 1926. BD-UEP: March 15, 1927. Contemporaneously, the City Hall of
Lisbon signed a contract with CRGE for 50 years.
ISABEL BARTOLOME´ RODRI´GUEZ
310 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
The municipality applied to the government for this water permission, the
financial plan was finished and, in December, the whole scheme was assessed
by a committee of engineering experts from Motor-Columbus in Switzerland55.
However, the project required financial support from the state and Bitetos was
finally blocked. Other companies showed interest in the Porto electricity mar-
ket. Varosa and Carrı´s offered their services together with the San Pedro da Cova
coalmines, when Cavado was said to be about to start the works. Varosa and the
UEP reached a market agreement in June and, in September, the UEP also
agreed terms with Carrı´s56. Although a tender was opened for supplying Porto
with electricity in August 1931, there were no applicants. As mentioned above,
the government had initiated a second ruling period on electricity. Since the
governmental plan had not yet been revealed, Porto’s municipality had to
negotiate the extension of the contract once again in June 193257.
Supplier rates were not changed in the new arrangement between the
municipality and the UEP, although the municipality had had severe diffi-
culties paying the bill in gold currency after the Stabilisation Decree in June
1931. The conflict continued for years until May 1935 when the UEP agreed
to reduce the rates by one-third after Administration and Court arbitration58.
This effective cut in the energy prices for the municipality paved the way for
a new franchise tender in July 1936. The UEP was the only contender since
their proposal included some electricity from Varosa and Carrı´s59. The City
Hall did not immediately accept the offer and reports were requested from
two experts on the prices of alternative means of obtaining electricity60. The
aim of the reports was to help the municipality consider the UEP’s HT rate
proposal. Ferreira Dias considered it unacceptable because the prices were
double those in the experts’ reports and suggested a new cut in the rates and
also insisted on the need to decrease the final retail prices61.
The contemporaneous conflict for the payment in gold currency between
Porto’s municipality and the UEP did not cease. The authorities did not
effectively pay the company for the energy and, consequently, the firm’s
capacity to renegotiate a new contract was damaged62. Finally, in June 1938,
Decree No. 28.665 ignored any formal guarantees and the contract was
55 Motor-Columbus, dependent since its origins as Motor upon Brown-Bovery from Switzerland.
UEP against Bitetos, in BD-UEP: April 30, 1928. The formal application took place in February 1928
(Campos 1938, pp. 121-128).
56 CD-EDP: UEP G4-2.2.3.
57 CD-EDP: FD 28 C4P1 (Campos 1938, pp. 148, 203).
58 BD-UEP: May 1, 1935. The rate decrease would be made against the opinion of Ferreira Dias.
CD-EDP: FD 39 C1P3.
59 BD-UEP: July 18, 1936 (Matos 2003a, p. 117).
60 The authorities were Vasco Taborda Ferreira and Augusto Basto Ferreira de Amaral.
CD-EDP: FD 42 C5 P2.
61 CD-EDP: FD 41-C4P5: March 4, 1937.
62 BD-UEP: February 22, 1937; BD-UEP May 10, 1937. The conflict did not end until the Supreme
Court intervention in May 1938. The sentence was favourable to UEP. BD-UEP: May 4, 1938.
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granted to a consortium of the UEP, Varosa and the Companhia Electro-
Hidra´ulica de Portugal (CEHE)63. As Matos put it, in the context of rising
demand for energy during the 2nd World War, the scarcity of coal and the
drop in the electricity price made it easy to expand the electricity market in
the Porto region (Matos 2003a, p. 217). The integration of the networks
advanced during the war and the plan for a regional electricity market in
north Portugal was raised for the first time64.
It may be said that, thanks to Ferreira Dias, the status quo in the elec-
tricity market in Porto was terminated in 1938. The new contract put an end
to both excessively high retail and supplier rates and favoured rapid elec-
trification by the expansion of the regional market. Some contemporaries
pointed out that the lucrative position of the UEP was supported by Campos
until 1938 when he left the board of SMGE. He was accused of being a major
shareholder of UEP in 1931, although he denied it (Campos 1938, p. 230).
SMGE figures essentially reveal what internal sources had anticipated:
the agreement was particularly favourable to the interests of the agency. As
can be seen in Figure 7, average prices of hydroelectricity sold by SMGE
were increased from the level of the previous thermal service and maintained
until 1938 when they started decreasing65. This evolution cannot be
explained by the variations in the share of use (HT/LT) because they both
appeared to follow a similar trend66. In real terms, this evolution is not so
different: retail prices were even increasing between 1935 and 1939.
As can be seen in Figure 8, the evolution of energy costs (rates paid to
the main supplier, the UEP) did not drive the level of electricity prices. Nor
were they determined simply by the foreign currency scenario as some
contemporaries suggested. Retail prices were essentially a by-product of an
astonishing level of profits for purchased kWh for the SMGE in the electricity
branch67. The percentage of unit profit was higher than the energy unit cost
for the majority of years up to 1938, while the latter had started to decline
around 1933-1934. Electricity costs did not reach more than 40-50 per cent
of the total unit price until 1940, although total costs were made up of
the expenses of public illumination and all municipal electricity services
until 194068.
63 BD-UEP: June 7, 1938 and BD-UEP: June 14, 1938 (Matos 2003a, p. 120). CD-EDP: UEP G4
24-10.
64 «Decreto Regulador e Coordinador da Produçao e Distribuçao de Energia Electrica». BD-
UEP: 03/27/1942. BD-UEP: June 3, 1943.
65 The average prices kept on decreasing until 1960 — 0.56 Escudos in 1950 and 0.49 in 1960
(Caˆmara Municipal de Porto 1950-60).
66 See Caˆmara Municipal de Porto (1922-1945). This information is only available for some
years.
67 For example, the UEP’s level of unit profit in constant prices was at least ten times lower than
the corresponding figure for SMGE.
68 The percentage of energy unit cost kept growing until 1960 — 52 per cent in 1950 and almost
60 per cent in 1960 (Caˆmara Municipal de Porto 1950-1960).
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The consequences of this rate policy affected not only the progress of
electricity consumption but also its pattern of use in Porto. Porto’s electricity
market preserved the characteristics of a pre-World War I market. Between
1923 and 1943 (inclusive) there was a 6.82 per cent growth in the electricity
sold by SMGE. However, this rate was lower than that of the previous phase,
12.94 from 1917 to 1922, and intensified to 10.41 per cent from 1923 to 1927
(Figure 9). This meant there was a substitution effect at the beginning, but
then the electrification process stopped69. From 1928 to 1938, consumption
grew at ,4.15 per cent; however, the figures did not properly reflect the effect
due to municipal consumption — a remarkable share of the total electricity
employed was assigned to a different account after 1941. Thus, although elec-
trical demand grew at ,4.75 per cent from 1939 to 1945, the proportion of the
electricity sold was significantly higher when the rates were cut70.
Thus, there were no significant changes in the allocation of electricity by
the SMGE until the late 1930s. First, the delivery system in Porto remained
essentially inefficient, because there continued to be high levels of waste
(,15 per cent) during the whole period, since returns were not invested in
FIGURE 7
SMGE OF PORTO. RETAIL PRICES OF ELECTRICITY
(kWh) (Nominal (left) and Real (right) Escudos).
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Sources: Caˆmara Municipal de Porto (1922-1945). Bastien (2001). Notes: 1928: first semester; 1934-
1935: year and a half. After 1941, own consumption and other services are accounted for separately.
69 In line with Devine’s (1983) proposal.
70 The SMGE’s sales of electricity multiplied threefold in the period 1945-1950 and they
duplicated once again until 1955 (Caˆmara Municipal de Porto 1945-1955).
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improving the distribution system. Second, urban lighting continued to
represent an important part of total consumption and continued growing
until 1940, when it accounted for 23 per cent of the total electricity dis-
tributed by SMGE71. Finally, the total share of purchased electricity was no
more than 65 per cent of total electricity available until the 1940s.
Similarly, electricity distribution was likely to have been stationary in
terms of the tension of delivery, that is, SMGE did not succeed in increasing
the consumption of HT in its area of distribution and there was a fixed group
of HT consumers72. In Porto, this consumption remained ,65 per cent from
1927 to 194373. The annual hours of use of the installed capacity remained
very low (totalised 673 annual hours of use in 1943), because there was a
predominance of intermittent use. Furthermore, the proportion of small
engines grew during the period: whereas the number of engines increased
fivefold, capacity multiplied only fourfold. In the period 1934-1943, the
FIGURE 8
SMGE OF PORTO: ELECTRICITY SERVICE. UNIT-COSTS AND UNIT-BENEFITS
(% of average income of retailed kWh).
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Source: Caˆmara Municipal de Porto (1922-1945).
71 Since 1941, electricity delivered to other municipal services was not included in this account.
72 35 consumers of HT were served by SMGE in 1940. Their annual consumption accounted
for 32,279 kWh, while the consumption of an average LT consumer was 230 kWh/year. Caˆmara
Municipal de Porto (1918-1945).
73 SMGE was limited by contract to retailing electricity to small consumers, but the agency may
not have been interested in selling HT since it did not maximise their revenues.
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consumption of electricity per head for motive power remained fixed, while
household illumination gradually substituted public lighting as the most
important use (see Table 5). Therefore, internal evidence reveals that
FIGURE 9
THE EVOLUTION OF THE EXPLOITATION OF ELECTRICITY BY SMGE,
PORTO (kWh)
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TABLE 5
ELECTRICITY ANNUAL CONSUMPTION PER INHABITANT IN THE CITY OF
PORTO (kWh)
Urban lighting Household lighting Motive power Total consumption
1935 12.04 22.40 21.03 55.47
1940 18.64 32.60 14.54 65.78
1945 7.56 42.56 55.40 105.52
1950 15.11 202.45 99.19 316.75
1955 19.30 348.05 148.54 515.89
1960 23.85 554.67 259.83 838.35
Source: Caˆmara Municipal de Porto (1935-1960). After 1941, municipal consumption and other
services are accounted for separately.
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20 years after hydroelectricity had become available, Porto’s electricity
market remained largely unchanged.
To recap, an analysis of the evolution of SMGE’s electricity exploitation
reveals that the intense electrification of the Porto area was not the agency’s
priority. Firstly, electricity prices remained high until the outbreak of the
2nd World War because electricity consumption was regarded as an important
source of funds for cancelling the agency’s deficit and paying the expenses of
urban lighting, but not for augmenting the efficiency of the delivery system.
Secondly, the UEP was engaged in this market by the very nature of its assets.
Its income was mostly dependent on the Porto market and it therefore adapted
to these circumstances. The company had no opportunity to command a
regional market, although the company’s return on investment was preserved
by maximising the income from the main customer: contracts were too short,
density of use too low and distribution areas were too small. Third, both the
municipality and the UEP colluded against electricity consumers. At municipal
level, franchise procedures were under suspicion and rates were decided by
circumstances other than the regulation of the market: the payment of the loan
in 1923 and the eventual competition of coal in 1937. In the short run, inhabi-
tants, officers and shareholders could benefit from this arrangement, but in the
long run this remunerative equilibrium should have come to an end with the
unavoidable enlargement of the electricity market.
As of 1938, the local drop in the electricity rates gave rise to the elec-
trification of Porto. The symbiotic rapport between the UEP and the SMGE
ended and the status quo was broken. On the one hand, the UEP needed the
support of other companies to supply Porto with electricity as recent state
legislation indicated; on the other hand, SMGE adopted a new and efficient
price-cutting plan. These changes were fostered by the Junta de Elec-
trificaça˜o, headed by Jose N. Ferreira Dias. The Junta can be said to have
achieved its aim of expanding electricity markets in the north of Portugal
despite the effective opposition of the UEP and perhaps SMGE.
This straight explanation might be inaccurate. The government had impeded
both public and private initiatives aimed at increasing economies of scale in
generation and transmission cycles. On the one hand, the UEP was not allowed
to enlarge either the sources of power or the size of its market, particularly after
1931 when authorisation to extend the lines to the south was refused. On the
other, the government had done away with the municipality’s plans for the
electrification of Porto. Moreover, from 1926 to the 1940s, government inter-
vention raised expectations about its participation in this industry although it
delayed initiatives from abroad. This uneven policy would have contributed to
hamper faster and more intensive electrification. Once the prices were cut in
1938, the annual hours of use of the installed capacity gradually grew as the use
of electricity was intensified and self-generation was substituted by commercial
electricity. The expansion of regional markets in the 1940s matched the
decreasing energy costs of hydroelectricity in the following decade.
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7. FINAL REMARKS
Our findings have confirmed that electricity consumption in Porto was
characterised by a slow rate of growth during the interwar period, as was the
case in the rest of Portugal. The persistence of self-generation and the low level
of per capita consumption show that energy substitution was still in progress by
the outbreak of the 2nd World War. The level of per capita income and the poor
endowment of natural resources in Portugal — that is, coal and waterfalls —
partly explain this limited electrification. However, Porto was a manufacturing
centre well served by inexpensive water power as of 1923 but still suffered from
a slow electrification. Electricity prices were not likely to be adequate for a
developing market and were mostly responsible for the stagnation of this
electrification. Hydroelectricity made no difference and no salient change was
observed in this electricity market during the interwar period.
The institutional setting was decisive in the implementation of electricity
rates in Porto. Between 1922 and 1938, electricity prices were kept high
because the supplier and the retailer of Porto, a municipal agency, achieved a
symbiotic equilibrium in this small market, which benefited the aims of both
in the short term. The electricity company was adequately remunerated, the
agency’s debt was reimbursed and the inhabitants of Porto enjoyed urban
lighting without the reverse of an eventual increase in municipal taxes.
However, the electrification suffered from a prominent backwardness, which
affected consumers and essentially the manufacturing sector.
This collusion went hand in hand with the obstruction to the indis-
pensable increase of scale — namely, generation and transmission — and the
building of a regional market of electricity in north Portugal. First, the
electricity company in charge of generation was likely to be underpaid for
some years. Second, the government’s hesitant policy reinforced the risk of
any investment on behalf of either private companies or the municipality up
to 1938. Third, the government refused successive projects of electrification
on behalf of foreign companies during the period. Actually, capital was not
channelled into the Portuguese electricity sector, the technology transfer was
suspended and the electricity sector in north Portugal did not benefit from
the advantages in both price and quality of regionally integrated electricity
systems until the 1950s. Therefore, the institutional scenario should be
added to the usually mentioned origins of the relative backwardness of the
Portuguese electricity sector before the 2nd World War.
In the 1940s, with the change in relative prices of primary energies during the
war and the unavoidable increase in the scale of electricity markets, electricity
expanded beyond the city limits and electricity prices were therefore cut and
Porto’s electrification expanded as it had done during the 1920s in other manu-
facturing cities. Furthermore, the early electricity market of Porto may help us to
illustrate how the transition of market regulation from municipal to state bodies
during the 1940s took place. Changes in relative prices triggered institutional
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changes during the war and, thus, an important drop in electricity prices is
observed. To a certain extent, both Campos and Ferreira Dias were right. The
country was poor, but the companies were not likely to be interested in investing
without assuring the payback in such an institutional scenario. However, none of
them put an end to this situation before 1938.
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